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TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060070-CA

v,
LORETO ROJAS SALGADO,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on two counts of
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a
public parking lot, a first degree felony (R. 119). This Court
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case

to the jury or did defense counsel render ineffective assistance
of counsel for not filing a motion for directed verdict, where
the evidence and its reasonable inferences, viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that
defendant unlawfully distributed a controlled substance within
1000 feet of a public parking lot?

1

To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should
have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

State v.

In reviewing a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).

This claim presents

a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying
trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-17, 12 P.3d

92.
2.

Did the trial court err by permitting the State to amend

count II of the information before trial to allege that defendant
distributed oxycodone rather than Lortab, both of which are
"controlled substances" within the meaning of the law?
Whether the trial court properly permitted an information to
be amended presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness,
with some deference accorded to the trial court for its factual
findings.

State v. Bush, 2001 UT App 10, 110, 47 P. 3d 69

(citations omitted).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes,

••- " V e s are

dispositive in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public parking lot (R.
1-2).

A jury convicted him as charged (R. 100-01).

The court

sentenced defendant to two concurrent five-to-life prison terms
(R. 111).

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 123).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Sean Henderson, a recovering prescription :irug addict, was
working with the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force as a
confidential informal it :i i I t h e s p r i n g o
140: 59).

-•

>.

Pursuant to a contract with the Strike Force, Sean

agreed to make his best efforts to secure four "prosecutable
[drug] charges;" the State, in turn, would recommend that he
serve county jail time with work release iii lieu of prison for
charges currently pending against him (R. 139: 157).
Sean and defendant had both worked at a Holiday Inn, where
Sean's pill addiction was apparently common knowledge (R. I10r
59).

At the motel, defendant let Sean know that she could obtain

prescription pills for him (Id.).

During the first half of 2004,

he would tell her how much money he had, and she would supply him
with prescription pills (Id. at 59-60).

He estimated he had

bought pills from her at least 20 times (Id. at 66).

3

In early April, working with the Strike Force, Sean set up
two monitored drug buys from defendant.
essentially the same way.

Both unfolded in

Sean met officers near a Chevron

station in West Haven, where both he and the vehicle he was
driving were searched.

Sean was given $100 in prerecorded bills

and wired with an electronic audio monitoring device (R. 139:
159, 163, 176; R. 140: 11, 13, 68). One officer got in Sean's
vehicle with him, accompanying him throughout the transaction;
another positioned himself nearby to videotape the transaction;
still others were in the area, observing events unfold (R. 139:
162, 167-69; R. 140: 50-53, 123-25).
For both buys, Sean first contacted defendant by phone, told
her how much money he had and what pills he wanted (R. 139: 164).
The first time, accompanied by agent Dickson, Sean drove to the
Chevron station in a jacked-up truck (R. 140: 124).

Defendant

arrived at the Chevron parking lot moments later, stopping one
"stall" away from them (Id. at 124, 126).

Sean got out of the

truck and into the passenger seat of defendant's car (Id. at
124).

Agent Dickson testified that he leaned from the front

passenger seat over the center console of the truck, looking down
into defendant's vehicle (Id. at 126, 135-36).

From this vantage

point, he observed a hand-to-hand transaction (Id. at 125, 137).
Sean quickly returned to the truck and deposited a baggie with
pills in it on the center console (Id.).
away.
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The two then drove

The second transaction unfolded in much the same way, except
that Sean was drivi ng a "normal" car, and the transaction "•;,'.';
occurred as Sean, standing in the parking lot, leaned into the
defendant'' s driver' s side window.

Ii 1 tl: i:i s instai ice, Agent •

Dickson did not actually observe the hand-to-hand transfer (Id.
at 130, 138).

Dickson did, however, testify that when Sean left

his presence, he had $100 and that when he returned, he had a
baggie of pills in his hand, which he put on the console as soon
as he got back into the car (Id. at 130).
A chemist at the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services analyzed
pills from both drug buys.

The first drug submission, arising

from the first buy, was tested i n May of 2005.

It consisted of

two different pills, one of which was oxycodone
129).

-. . - .4,

The second sample, arising from the second buy, was tested

in November of 2005.

It consisted of 32 pillo

\

.3

different kinds, one of which was oxycodone (Id. at 125, 130).
The chemist testified that the dela> :i

testing the p:i ] I s from .•

the second buy did not affect their chemical composition (Id. at
133) .
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant on two
counts of distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet
of a public parking lot, a first degree felony (R. " ).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the trial court plainly erred in
submitting the case to the jury and that her counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a motion for
directed verdict because the State failed to adduce evidence that
the Chevron parking lot in which the drug transaction occurred
was a "public parking lot" within the meaning of the drug
enhancement statute.

This claim fails because evidence is

sufficient if both the evidence and its reasonable inferences,
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdictf
establish that the Chevron parking lot was "public."

Here, the

jury reasonably inferred that a business selling products to the
public maintains a parking lot for the specific purpose of
accommodating the entry of members of the public.

No more is

necessary to establish a public parking lot.
Defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion
by denying his motions to dismiss or continue.

This argument

fails at the outset because defendant made no such motions.
Rather, the State moved to amend count II of the information from
Lortab to oxycodone, and defendant objected, arguing he would
suffer prejudice as a result.

An information can be amended any

time until the verdict so long as "the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced."

Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). In this

case, where defendant was unable to articulate any prejudice,
where both Lortab and oxycodone are controlled substances, and
6

where the defense was that defendant met the confidential
informant to reimburse her for money he had borrowed, whether the
drug was Lortab or oxycodone is inconsequential, leaving
defendant's "substantial rights'' unaffected.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURYAND DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE
EVIDENCE AND ITS FAIR INFERENCES
ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT
DISTRIBUTED DRUGS IN A PARKING LOT
OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not
unilaterally issuing a directed verdict because the evidence was
insufficient to prove that the Chevron parking lot was a "public"
parking lot.

See Br. of Aplt. at 18-22.

Because defendant did

not preserve the issue at trial by filing a motion for a directed
verdict, she relies on a plain error argument on appeal. See
State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346 (generally, in
order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must raise
sufficiency claim by proper motion).

"[T]o establish plain

error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury."

Id.

at 117. Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial
7

showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental
that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury."

Id. at

118.
At the outset, defendant's argument is inadequately briefed.
While defendant cites and discusses several cases reversed for
insufficient evidence, she wholly fails to apply their teachings
to the facts of this case.

See Br. of Aplt. at 19-21.

Moreover,

her discussion of this specific case consists of less than a
paragraph and is wholly conclusory, incorporating no legal
analysis.1

Id. at 21-22.

"[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just

bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority."
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

State v. Thomas, 961

Absent any meaningful analysis, this

Court should decline to reach the merits of defendant's claim.
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 1 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992). 2

1

Defendant's fact-specific, substantive argument states in
its entirety: "It is undisputed that there were no witnesses who
testified that the Chevron parking lot was a public lot. The
prosecutor did not ask and the trial court did not take judicial
notice of that essential fact. The evidence was only speculative
that it was a public parking lot, and a criminal conviction
cannot be grounded upon speculation." Br. of Aplt. at 21-22.
2

The issue is waived for an additional reason. Had
defendant wished the jury to apply some particular definition of
"public parking lot," she should have requested such an
instruction from the court. The record reveals no such request.
8

Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails
because the public nature of the parking lot is an inferential
fact that the jury reasonably drew from undisputed evidence that
the drug sale transpired in a Chevron parking lot.

It is common

knowledge that businesses maintain parking lots in order to
accommodate members of the public who choose to avail themselves
of the services offered by the businesses.

A parking lot

associated with a gas station is thus "public" because it is
"common to all or many" and "not restricted to any particular
class of the community."

Black's Law Dictionary 1104 (5th ed.

1979).

Utah courts have embraced this view of public parking

lots.

.See Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, OT 2, 29, 44

P.3d 767 (describing the back parking lot of a bar); Hansen v.
America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, % 2, 96 P.3d 950 (describing a
parking lot owned by a strip mall as a "public parking lot")/
accord United States v. Biqsby, 145 Fed.Appx. 595, 596 (9th Cir.
2005) (describing the parking lot of a closed business as a
"public parking lot"); Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 716-718
(Tex. App. 2003) (repeatedly describing parking lot between two
businesses as a "public parking lot). Some courts have
specifically referred to a gas station parking lot as a "public
parking lot."

See, e.g.,

State v. Martinez, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125

(Idaho Ct. App. 2001); State v. Robinson, 206 A.2d 779, 780 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).

Absent any evidence that the public

was restricted in its use of this parking lot, the jury was well
9

within its prerogative in inferring that the gas station parking
lot in which the drugs were sold was a "public parking lot."
Consequently, the trial court did not plainly err in submitting
the case to the jury.
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a directed verdict.
18.

See Br. of Aplt. at 15-

Because a motion for a directed verdict would have been

futile, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to file the motion.

See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App

295, 1 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that "'failure of counsel to
make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does
not constitute ineffective assistance.'")(citation omitted).
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error thus
both fail.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE
COURT DENIED HIS MOTION TO DISMISS
OR CONTINUE FOR FAILURE TO GIVE
ADEQUATE EXPERT WITNESS NOTICE IS
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; RATHER,
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED THE STATE'S
MOTION, TO WHICH DEFENDANT
OBJECTED, TO AMEND THE INFORMATION
BEFORE TRIAL, A CHANGE THAT DID NOT
PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS
Defendant argues that because the State violated the
statutory notice provision governing expert witnesses, the trial
court should have granted his motions to dismiss and to continue.
See Br. of Aplt. at 3-4.

This argument fails because defendant
10

moved neither to dismiss nor to continue.

Nothing in the record

before this Court suggests that he filed such motions.3

Indeed,

defendant's failure to seek a continuance negates any claim of
surprise and waives his issue on appeal.

See, e.g.. State v.

Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Utah App. 1989).
The record does reveal that defendant objected to the
State's motion to amend the information.

See R. 139: 3, 82-90.

However, he never mentioned the expert witness statute, much less
its notice provision.

The substantive thrust of his argument

below was that if the trial court permitted the State to amend
the information right before trial, he would suffer prejudice.
See Id. at 82-90.
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, makes clear the
State's right to amend an information:
The court may permit an indictment or
information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense
is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced.
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). Even if defendant had properly preserved
this issue, under the factual circumstances here, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment because
defendant's "substantial rights" were not affected by changing
the information from Lortab to oxycodone.
3

The relevant citations in the statement of issues of
appellant's brief lead back only to the State's motion to amend
and defendant's objections to it. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-4. The
summary of argument and the argument itself contain no record
citations at all. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-12; 22-30).
11

Defendant was originally charged with two counts of
distribution of a controlled substance — the first count for
oxycodone and the second for Lortab (R. 1-2). After the
information was filed, a chemist from the Utah Bureau of Forensic
Services tested the pills supporting the first count, confirming
that one was oxycodone, a controlled substance (R. 139: 130).
The parties stipulated to this lab test result (Id. at 84, 90).
The chemist did not receive any pills relating to the second
count, which was charged as Lortab.
A week prior to trial, defense counsel notified the State
that the second sample had never been tested.

The State,

accordingly, sent the second set of pills to the same chemist,
who determined that the pill previously thought to be Lortab was
in fact oxycodone (Id. at 84, 130-31).

When the State received

this news just before trial, it immediately informed defense
counsel (Id. at 85). On the morning of trial, the State then
moved to amend the information on Count II from distribution of
Lortab to distribution of oxycodone, both of which are controlled
substances (Id. at 3). Defendant objected to the amendment,
claiming prejudice (Id.).
The trial court permitted the amendment but also probed
defendant's allegation of prejudice.

During an extended

discussion, the court was unable to elicit from defense counsel
the precise nature of the prejudice arising from amending the
information.

The court then suggested:
12

So you think you might be able to show there
was confusion somewhere about exactly what
this drug was that might raise reasonable
doubt in the jury's mind. . . if you had been
able to properly prepare and perhaps
challenge [the State, ^W]hy did you charge it
as Lortab then if you're now claiming it was
oxycodone[?']
(Id. at 87-88).

The court noted, "I'm not sure it's two cents'

worth of difference because they're both illegal drugs. . . but
. . . when a defense is trying to raise questions about the
validity of the State's evidence, they should be given a free
hand to raise every possible reasonable issue" (Id. at 90-91).
At the court's suggestion, then, the chemist and one other
witness testified about the "confusion" that caused the substance
to be charged initially as Lortab (Id. at 89).
Nothing about this course of events suggests that the court
abused its discretion in amending the information.
Lortab and oxycodone are controlled substances.

First, both

The State's

burden was to prove only that defendant distributed a controlled
substance.

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Defendant

would be as culpable for selling one drug as the other.

Second,

the defense in this case was that the confidential informant owed
defendant $400, called her to tell her he had $100, and met her
to pay that money back (R. 139: 110, 115; R. 140: 16). Pursuant
to such a defense, whether the pills were Lortab or oxycodone is
inconsequential.

Finally, the lack of prejudice is plainly

attested to by counsel's inability to articulate in a specific
and meaningful way the impact of the change on defendant's
13

"substantial rights. "4
fails.

For all of these reasons, the claim

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

permitting the State to amend the information.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on two counts of distribution of a controlled
substance within 1000 feet of a public parking lot, a first
degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _OJ_ day of October, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Counsel first argued that a change would prejudice
defendant because "we've prepared our defense surrounding the
fact the State has called Lortab in count 2" (R. 139: 82). The
State responded that an information could be amended at any time
until the verdict and that, in any event, both Lortab and
oxycodone were controlled substances, each of which could support
an unlawful distribution charge (Id.). The court then asked
defendant what disadvantage the change would engender (Id. at
83). Counsel responded that if the information for count II
remained Lortab, he could call an expert witness to testify that
the pill was not Lortab (Id.). The court replied, "[I]'m
wondering what is the problem other than the possibility that
. . . your client would be convicted of possessing oxycodone
rather than Lortab" (Id.). Defense counsel suggested that the
delay in testing the drug might be problematic, but conceded that
"[w]e haven't had a chance to consult with experts to see how it
would affect our defense" (Id. at 84; accord id. at 87).
Unconvinced, the court reiterated, "Tell me what you would have
done differently" (Id. at 87). Counsel replied, "[W]e could have
consulted with experts to see what our defense would be. We
wouldn't know what it would be until we talked to the expert"
(Id.). Defendant's responses clearly do not establish the firm
likelihood of a different outcome absent the alleged error in
permitting the amendment.
14
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